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YOU SAY YES, I SAY NO: INSULATING THE INITIATIVE POWER 
AGAINST LEGISLATIVE TAMPERING IN VOTING AND ELECTORAL 
REFORMS 
Louis C. Dodge Jr.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Elections are often hailed as reflecting “the will of the people,” with 
legislators claiming broad mandates to implement their legislative 
agendas.  But what happens when the electorate’s legislative power 
comes into conflict with the legislature’s legislative power?  More 
specifically, what happens when the peoples’ attempted reforms 
concern the electoral process itself, and the people’s representatives 
fight back?   
Consider, for instance, the plight of a Floridian who cast a ballot in 
support of Amendment 4 in 2018.  Amendment 4 was a ballot initiative 
which, if approved, would amend the state constitution to restore voting 
rights to individuals convicted of a felony, excluding murderers and sex 
offenders, who have “complete[d] their sentence[s].”1  The campaign for 
Amendment 4 succeeded, with 64.5% of Florida voters casting their 
ballots in favor of restoring the franchise to individuals with felony 
convictions.2  Mere months later, however, the Republican-controlled 
Florida legislature passed a new law, S.B. 7066, which provided that an 
individual with a felony conviction would not be characterized as having 
“complet[ed] all terms of [a] sentence” until that person had repaid in 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; Executive Editor, Seton Hall 
Law Review; B.A., University of Vermont.  I would like to thank Professors Lori Borgen 
and Michael Coenen for their invaluable insight into this paper, which grew dramatically 
from its inception over the course of unfolding events.  I am grateful to the Seton Hall 
Law Review for their diligent work toward publishing this Comment and to Avi Muller 
for his superb stewardship of this institution through a tumultuous year.  This Comment 
is dedicated to the individuals, in Florida and elsewhere, who are denied the right to 
vote based solely on their inability to pay legal fines and fees.   
 1 FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020); FLA. DEPT. OF STATE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, NOV. 6, 
2018 GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL RESULTS, https://results.elections.myflorida.com/
index.asp?electiondate=11/6/2018&datamode= (select “Const. Amendments” under 
the “Select Office” dropdown menu). 
 2 Id. 
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full all legal fines and fees flowing from that sentence.3  This statutory 
enactment effectively made voting rights restoration all but impossible 
for many, as the Florida Clerk of Courts association acknowledges that 
more than 80% of legal financial obligations have “minimal collections 
expectations.”4   
In the midst of a constitutional challenge to S.B. 7066, the Governor 
of Florida requested an Advisory Opinion from the Florida Supreme 
Court regarding Amendment 4, asking “whether the phrase ‘all terms of 
sentence’ encompasses . . . fines, restitution, costs, and fees [] ordered 
by the sentencing court.”5  The court answered in the affirmative, 
holding that “[t]he language at issue, read in context, has an 
unambiguous ordinary meaning that voters would most likely 
understand to encompass obligations including LFOs.”6  The court’s 
decision arguably goes beyond its precedents to determine the intent of 
the legislation and mandates, rather than allows, repayment of legal 
financial obligations before becoming eligible for voting rights 
restoration.  The effect of the legislature’s interpretation of the 
amendment is clear, particularly in light of a recent federal court 
decision holding that Amendment 4, as interpreted by the Florida state 
legislature and Supreme Court, does not violate the federal 
Constitution.7  The legislature could have clarified the “all terms of 
sentence” language to further the electorate’s goal of restoring voting 
rights to thousands of individuals with a felony conviction.  Instead, the 
legislature undermined the will of the electorate, as demonstrated 
through the constitutional initiative, was undermined by deciding to 
interpret the provision, not defined in the initiative itself, in such a 
strictly textualist manner.8   
 
 3 FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2020). 
 4 See Daniel Rivero, Felons Might Have to Pay Hundreds of Millions Before Being Able 
to Vote in Florida, WLRN PUB. RADIO & TELEVISION (Jan. 20, 2019, 7:38 PM), 
https://www.wlrn.org/post/felons-might-have-pay-hundreds-millions-being-able-
vote-florida.  Annual collection rates vary widely, “from 83 percent in 2015 down to as 
low as 43 percent in 2013.”  Matthew Menendez, Michael F. Crowley, Lauren-Brooke 
Eisen & Noah Atchison, The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fines and Fees, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. 45 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/
2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final.pdf; see also Meghan Keneally, “It’s Not America: 11 
Million Go Without a License Because of Unpaid Fines, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/vicious-cycle-11-million-live-drivers-license-unpaid/
story?id=66504966.  
 5 Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting 
Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2020).  
 6 Id. at 1078 (internal quotations omitted). 
 7 See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 8 FLA. DEPT. OF STATE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 1. 
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This dynamic has manifested itself several times with respect to 
voting and electoral laws passed by ballot initiative.  In South Dakota, 
legislators repealed an initiated campaign finance statute.9  In Idaho, 
despite voter approval of three initiatives on the issue of term limits for 
state and local officials over six years, legislators repealed the measures 
that would have prevented them from seeking reelection.10  Florida, 
South Dakota, and Idaho all illustrate that when faced with new electoral 
or voting laws passed directly by the electorate, legislatures have 
chosen to amend, repeal, or effectively nullify those initiatives’ results.   
Certainly, there may be justifications for these responses to 
legislation-by-initiative; for example, an extensive body of literature 
documents the downsides of voter initiatives and the risks they pose for 
minority groups.11  When given the unfettered opportunity to do so, 
majority groups have shaped (and likely will continue to shape) 
electoral laws to maximize their own powers.12  But the lesser-known 
problem is that of majorities—and even supermajorities—of voters 
conferring new rights and more substantial access to the ballot box 
through ballot initiatives, only to see those reforms rolled back or 
altogether repealed by a majority of elected representatives.  These 
dynamics create comparably significant barriers to vulnerable groups’ 
abilities to exercise their political power.  Just as scholars caution that 
states should safeguard minorities against tyranny of the majority at 
large,13 states should equally protect minorities from a handful of 
powerful individuals who choose to defy the will of the people by rolling 
back expansions of the franchise, campaign finance reforms, term limits, 
and other laws which directly affect how legislators are chosen.  
 
 9 See discussion infra Section II.0. 
 10 See discussion infra Section II.0. 
 11 See, e.g., Kristen Barnes, Breaking the Cycle: Countering Voter Initiatives and the 
Underrepresentation of Racial Minorities in the Political Process, 12 DUKE F. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 123, 125 (2017); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to 
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978); Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and 
Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1745 (2013); Julian N. Eule, Judicial 
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1557–58 (1990); Cynthia L. Fountaine, 
Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating 
by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 (1988). 
 12 For example, following the 2010 census, a number of state political parties took 
advantage of their controlling both the legislative and executive branches of government 
in their respective states to draw legislative and congressional district lines that helped 
to entrench their majorities for the coming decade and make it more difficult for the 
minority party to be competitive.  Alex Tausanovitch, The Impact of Partisan 
Gerrymandering, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 1, 2019, 9:01 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/10/01/475166/impact-partisan-
gerrymandering. 
 13 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 11. 
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Initiatives have become a useful tool for voters to push back against 
unresponsive legislatures in an era of highly partisan politics, 
particularly in the realm of voting rights and electoral reforms.  This 
Comment proposes that, because a higher degree of democratic 
participation facilitates a more inclusive and democratic society, 
legislatures must be limited in their ability to amend or repeal initiated 
statutes.  In this way, initiatives can serve as a tool to expand the 
franchise and facilitate democratic accountability in an era where nearly 
unfettered campaign finance has reduced legislators’ responsiveness to 
their respective constituents’ will.  
This Comment will examine how state legislatures across the 
United States have pushed back on—and in some cases, 
nullified—voting and electoral initiatives passed by large majorities of 
the voting population.14  Unlike the federal Constitution,15 many state 
constitutions create mechanisms for citizens to directly propose and 
force a popular vote on binding legislation or constitutional 
amendments; indeed, a majority of states allow citizens to initiate 
legislation themselves or veto legislation through a referendum.16  The 
 
 14 This Comment focuses on state legislatures, but it would be irresponsible not to 
point out the similar dynamics at play following the 2020 U.S. Presidential election.  
Though the Trump campaign’s efforts to reverse the results of an election that he lost 
the popular vote by over six million votes ultimately proved unsuccessful, Presidential 
Election Results: Biden Wins, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
11/03/us/elections/results-president.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2020), the anti-
democratic institutional consequences of the (now former) President’s campaign to 
undermine the election results will surely endure, see Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti, 
‘An Indelible Stain’: How the G.O.P Tried to Topple a Pillar of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/us/politics/trump-lawsuits-
electoral-college.html.  At the heart of these efforts was the same desire to override the 
popular will—the election of President Biden—through a concerted effort to lobby state 
legislators to elect a Republican slate of electors.  See Clara Hendrickson, Donald Trump 
Called Monica Palmer After Wayne County Board of Canvassers Meeting, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Nov. 19, 2020, 7:35 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
detroit/2020/11/19/trump-monica-palmer-wayne-canvassers-certification-election/
3776190001; Ed White et al., Trump Summons Michigan GOP Leaders for Extraordinary 
Meeting, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/trump-invites-
michigan-gop-white-house-6ab95edd3373ecc9607381175d6f3328.  As this Comment 
demonstrates, that state legislators and election officials chose to act according to the 
popular will in this instance more likely reflects the immense public pressure and 
publicity surrounding election certification in one of the most contentious election 
cycles in history than it does those officials’ commitment to upholding basic democratic 
principles.  Only time will tell what consequences this high-profile effort to reject the 
popular will might have on elections and ballot initiatives moving forward, but that issue 
is largely beyond the scope of this paper.  
 15 Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1079–87 (1988). 
 16 Initiative and Referendum Processes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 
31, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-and-
DODGE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  10:57 PM 
2021] COMMENT 1321 
federal Constitution has left these states with significant leeway to 
allocate their legislative powers in different ways, and many states have 
chosen to vest some degree of power to propose and enact legislation 
directly in the electorate.17  In Part II, this Comment looks first at three 
instances of legislative “nullification”—cases in which the legislature 
repealed or amended a piece of initiated legislation in a manner that 
changed its effects and achieved a result that was counter to the 
expressed will of the electorate.  Part III examines why today’s political 
climate necessitates state constitutional amendments that insulate the 
initiative power with respect to voting and electoral reforms while 
expanding judicial review.  Part IV analyzes existing models for these 
types of constraints, looking particularly at constitutional restraints in 
Arizona and California on the legislature’s ability to repeal or amend 
enacted initiatives.  Finally, Part V proposes a remedial amendment to 
state constitutions and examines counterarguments to that proposal.  
II.  LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE TO VOTING AND ELECTORAL REFORMS THROUGH 
BALLOT INITIATIVES 
It is important to distinguish an initiative from a referendum at the 
outset; in common parlance, these phrases are often conflated.  An 
initiative is “[a]n electoral process by which a percentage of voters can 
propose legislation and compel a vote on it . . .” by the electorate itself.18  
In contrast, a referendum is “[t]he process of referring a state legislative 
act, a state constitutional amendment, or an important public issue to 
the people for final approval by popular vote,” or a vote taken pursuant 
to such a legislative referral.19  This Comment focuses on what some 
scholars have called “substitute” direct democracy rather than 
“complementary” direct democracy.20  Through “substitute” direct 
democracy, the people assume the power of legislators and circumvent 
the formal legislative and executive branches to propose, and 
potentially enact, their chosen policies.21  In contrast, “complementary” 
direct democracy entails legislative referral of legislation to the 
electorate for approval.22  This discussion excludes from consideration 
“indirect” initiatives, which submit the proposed legislation to 
 
referendum-processes.aspx; Laws Governing Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Laws_governing_ballot_measures (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).  
 17 See discussion infra Part 0. 
 18 Initiative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).  
 19 Referendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 20 Eule, supra note 11, at 1510. 
 21 See id. 
 22 Id. at 1512. 
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legislators before being placed on the ballot for popular approval.23  
Because both indirect initiatives and referenda require legislative 
consideration prior to being put before the electorate, they are less 
relevant to this discussion.  This Comment also considers constitutional 
amendments passed by way of initiative.  Though different in terms of 
how they bind the legislature, the process by which these amendments 
are passed face similar dynamics, which have produced legislative 
responses akin to those of initiated statutes and thus warrant 
consideration.24 
South Dakota, Idaho, and Florida present three cases where 
similar—yet procedurally distinct—dynamics resulted in the effective 
nullification of voter-approved ballot initiatives.  These episodes 
demonstrate three approaches for legislatures to defy even the most 
broadly supported voter initiatives by choosing either to repeal the law 
or implement it based on legislators’ own self-interest.  There are other 
instances of these dynamics at work,25 including instances outside the 
scope of this Comment, where legislatures have pushed back in a similar 
way against reforms unrelated to elections or voting laws.  Ultimately, 
the three states discussed herein present a diverse array of issues and 
procedures that arise when the electorate’s legislative power comes 
into conflict with the legislature’s legislative power. 
  
 
 23 Id. at 1511. 
 24 For example, in Florida, which allows initiatives to amend the constitution but not 
to pass ordinary legislation, the initiative must be filed with the Secretary of State’s 
office, a petition in favor of the initiative must be signed by voters in each congressional 
district equal to eight percent of the votes cast in the last preceding election, and the 
initiative must be approved by 60% of voters.  FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e).  In comparison, 
South Dakota requires sponsors of an initiated statute to file a copy of the proposed 
statute with the Secretary of State prior to collecting signatures, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-
1-1.2 (2020), and then requires signatures of five percent of the number of votes in the 
previous gubernatorial election, S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.  Ordinary initiatives in South 
Dakota require only a majority vote for approval.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-1-12 (2020). 
 25 See infra Table 1. 
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A.  Ethics and Campaign Finance Reform in South Dakota 
In South Dakota, the people’s power to initiate laws on any subject 
is coextensive with the legislature’s authority to propose measures.26  
This power does not limit the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal any 
law passed by initiative.27  South Dakota voters chose to exercise their 
power in 2016 when they approved Measure 22, which was designed to 
lower maximum contribution amounts to Political Action Committees 
(PACs), political parties, and candidates; create a voluntary, publicly 
funded campaign finance program for statewide and legislative 
candidates; create an appointed ethics commission to administer the 
public financing system and enforce campaign finance laws; and 
prohibit certain state officials from lobbying after leaving government.28  
Voters approved Measure 22 by a three-point margin, voting 51.6% to 
48.4% in favor.29 
 
 26 Brendtro v. Nelson, 720 N.W.2d 670, 680 (S.D. 2006) (discussing the people’s 
power to repeal or amend laws passed by the state legislature).  The state constitution 
vests legislative power in the state legislature but reserves to the people “the right to 
propose measures, which shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state . . . 
except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public 
peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public 
institutions.”  S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.  For further discussion on South Dakota’s initiative 
power, see Jessica A. Levinson, Taking the Initiative: How to Save Direct Democracy, 18 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019, 1023 (2014); Nicholas R. Theodore, Note, We the People: A 
Needed Reform of State Initiative and Referendum Procedures, 78 MO. L. REV. 1401, 1404 
(2013); State Initiative and Referendum, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. (2014), 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=24. 
 27 Brendtro, 720 N.W.2d at 682 (quoting State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W. 
707, 709 (S.D. 1915)).  Courts have further held that the lack of any explicit limitation 
on the legislature’s ability to amend, veto, or nullify ballot initiatives indicates the 
legislature’s power to do so.  This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Executive 
power to veto is barred, demonstrating that the framers of the 1898 amendment gave 
consideration to which branches of the state government should be able to amend such 
initiatives.  Whisman, 154 N.W. at 709–10 (comparing the South Dakota constitution to 
state constitutions which have expressly limited legislative power to repeal and/or 
amend initiated measures.).  South Dakota is one of eleven states with no restrictions on 
the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal initiatives.  Limiting the Legislature’s Power 
to Amend and Repeal Initiated Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATES LEGISLATURES (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/limits-on-legislative-
power.aspx; see also Legislative Alteration, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Legislative_alteration#States_with_no_restrictions (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 
 28 ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLANATION, INITIATED MEASURE 22, 2016 STATEWIDE BALLOT 
MEASURES, S.D. SEC’Y OF ST., https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/assets/2016FullTextof
theBallotQuestionProposals.pdf. 
 29 South Dakota Measure 22—Revise Campaign Finance and Lobbying Laws—Results: 
Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/
2016/results/south-dakota-ballot-measure-22-campaign-finance-overhaul.  South 
Dakota requires a simple majority in order for initiatives to be enacted into law.  S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 2-1-12 (2020). 
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On February 2, 2017, the Governor of South Dakota signed into law 
H.B. 1069, which repealed key sections of Measure 22 and amended 
others to dramatically limit the effect that the initiative could have on 
campaign finance in South Dakota.30  The text of H.B. 1069 provided that, 
because it was “necessary for the support of the state government and 
its existing institutions, an emergency [was] declared to exist.”31  
Through the use of the “legislative emergency” clause, the South Dakota 
legislature made it impossible for the repeal bill to be called for a 
referendum.32  The State Senate voted 27 to 8 in favor of repeal.33  
Supporters of the repeal effort argued that “Measure 22 was 
constitutionally murky and should be repealed and replaced with pieces 
that more clearly reflect the will of the voters.”34  But not everyone 
supported the bill.  Sen. Billie Sutton (D-Burke) stated before the 
passage of the repeal bill that it would “send[] the message that we do 
not trust [the people] to make decisions on ballot measures. . . . The 
bottom line is will we ignore the will of the people?”35  
Despite pledging to replace Measure 22 with new legislation that 
would resolve the alleged constitutional issues while still honoring “the 
will of the people,” the South Dakota legislature largely failed to restore 
the policies promised by Measure 22.  Through repeal, South Dakota 
lawmakers were effectively able to choose elements of the bill to 
implement and others to eliminate, in conflict with the expressed will of 
the voters through the election results.  The legislature restored 
campaign finance contributions to substantially higher pre-Measure 22 
levels, declined to enact the public financing system, and narrowly 
 
 30 H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017) (codified as Campaign Finance Repeal 
and Revise, 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 72 §§ 1–2 185).  
 31 Id. 
 32 For a discussion of the lawful functions of the emergency clause under South 
Dakota law, see Whisman, 154 N.W. at 711–12 (“The only lawful function of the 
emergency clause is to cause an enactment to go into effect as soon as signed by the 
executive, instead of waiting until the first day of the next July.  It must be observed that 
the initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution provides that any laws 
which the Legislature may have enacted shall, upon a proper referendum petition being 
filed, be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except 
such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 
health, or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions.”). 
 33 Dana Ferguson, S.D. Senate Strikes Voter-Approved Ethics Law, ARGUS LEADER (Feb. 
1, 2017, 7:59 PM), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/01/
sd-senate-strikes-voter-approved-ethics-law/97333962. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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defined other portions of the remaining provisions to limit their 
application.36 
In 2018, voters put an initiated constitutional amendment on the 
ballot that would have restored the proposed campaign finance and 
ethics reforms proposed in Measure 22 and created a voter approval 
requirement for any future legislatively-proposed amendments or 
repeal to take effect.37  The amendment did not pass, garnering only 
slightly more than 45% of the vote.38  This result highlights one potential 
issue with governing by initiative: consecutive or even simultaneous 
initiatives can receive inconsistent amounts of support, which only 
makes it more difficult to determine voters’ actual intent.  This becomes 
relevant, as demonstrated below, in the face of standards that constrain 
the legislature based on the core purposes of an initiative.39 
B.  Term Limits in Idaho 
In Idaho, voters approved Initiative 2 in 1994 to impose term limits 
on U.S. Representatives and Senators, and on state and local elected 
officials.40  Idaho voters overwhelmingly passed Initiative 2 with 59% of 
the vote.41  In 1996, after the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that state-
imposed term limits on U.S. Representatives and Senators were 
 
 36 Id.  While the legislature passed eight bills aimed at “creating lobbyist restrictions, 
allowing for investigation of wrongdoing in state government, and requiring more 
disclosure in campaign finance,” it did not approve a public campaign finance system, 
lower campaign contribution limits, or ban certain gifts from lobbyists as proposed 
under Measure 22.  Dana Ferguson, After Promising to Replace, Did Lawmakers Deliver 
on IM22?, ARGUS LEADER (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/
politics/2017/03/11/after-promising-replace-did-lawmakers-deliver-im22/9901
4304. 
 37 James Nord, Ethics Measure Approved to be on South Dakota’s 2018 Ballot, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ethics-measure-
approved-to-be-on-south-dakotas-2018-ballot. 
 38 South Dakota Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-south-
dakota-elections.html. 
 39 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 40 IDAHO CODE § 34-907 (1995).  Though there were federal constitutional defects 
with respect to the law’s applicability to federal elections that would ultimately be 
litigated, this Comment examines this and other Idaho initiatives solely for their effects 
on state and local officials.  Initiative 2 “established that certain persons shall not be 
eligible to have his or her name placed upon the primary or general election ballot[,]” 
although it did not prohibit voters from writing that person’s name on the ballot, nor did 
it prevent candidates from conducting write-in campaigns.  Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 
P.3d 598, 601–02 (Idaho 2001) (internal quotation omitted).  For an overview of Idaho’s 
initiative process and the events surrounding the term limits repeal, see Scott W. Reed, 
How and Why Idaho Terminated Term Limits, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 12 (2014).   
 41 IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE, ELECTION DIVISION, IDAHO INITIATIVE HISTORY (2019), 
https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/inithist.htm.  
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unconstitutional, Idaho voters enacted a second initiative that required 
candidates for Congress and the state legislature to “pledge to support 
term limits.”42  Portions of this second initiative were struck down as 
unconstitutional under the Idaho state constitution, but the instruction 
that members of Congress and state legislators support term limits was 
upheld.43  In 1998, Idaho voters again passed an initiative in favor of 
term limits, this time “allowing Congressional candidates to sign a term 
limits pledge.”44  This third initiative authorized the Secretary of State 
“to accept signed term limits pledge[s] from candidates” and required 
the Secretary to “place term limits pledge information on ballots” and in 
polling places.45  
In 2000, local officials sued to have the term limits on state and 
local legislators thrown out for being unconstitutional.46  Four state 
Republican leaders, who would soon be restricted from appearing on 
the ballot, intervened in the lawsuit.47  In Rudeen v. Cenarussa, the Idaho 
Supreme Court examined the legality of the entirety of the 1994 
initiative and found the term limits on state and local officials to be 
constitutional under both the state and federal constitutions.48  The 
 
 42 Simpson v. Cenarrusa (In re Writ of Prohibition & Declaratory Judgment), 944 
P.2d 1372, 1373 (Idaho 1997).  In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court held in U.S. Term Limits 
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) that states could not constitutionally impose term 
limits on candidates for the U.S House of Representatives or Senate.  Thornton left open 
the question, however, of whether states could constitutionally impose term limits on 
candidates for state or local office.  Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 849 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“As an initial matter, Thornton does not speak at all to the 
question of whether limits on the terms of state officeholders raises a substantial federal 
question.  Thornton is concerned exclusively with the constitutionality of state-imposed 
term limits on federal officeholders.  The Supreme Court’s decision was bottomed on the 
Qualifications Clause and the notion of a “national citizenship,” neither of which, of 
course, has any relevance to this case.”).  In Bates, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s 
term limits for elected state officials were constitutional under the first and fourteenth 
amendments.  Id. at 847.  Unlike in Thornton, where the Supreme Court scrutinized the 
law at issue under the Qualifications Clause, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the California 
law under the first and fourteenth amendments.  Id. at 848–49 (O’Scannlain, J., 
concurring). 
 43 Simpson, 944 P.2d at 1374–76.  
 44 IDAHO OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, IDAHO VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 3 (1998). 
 45 Id.  Under the initiative, candidates would agree that if they broke their pledge to 
voluntarily limit themselves to the term limits passed in previous initiatives, the words 
“Broke TERM LIMITS pledge” would appear next to their names on the ballot.  Id. at 4.  
Although some portions of the initiative were struck down in court, the state could still 
publish information about candidates’ position on the term limits pledge in voter 
education materials.  Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 15 P.3d 1129, 
1136–37 (Idaho 2000). 
 46 Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 602 (Idaho 2001). 
 47 Reed, supra note 40, at 20. 
 48 Rudeen, 38 P.3d at 609. 
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court held that the right to suffrage guaranteed under the state 
Constitution did not include the right to hold elected office.49  In so 
constraining elected officials’ right to hold office, the court viewed the 
1994 initiative as a valid exercise of the electorate’s constitutional 
initiative power.50  
At the 2000 state Republican convention, a former state legislator 
and the sponsor of the term limit repeal effort said of voters’ repeated 
support for term limits: “The people have spoken . . . they were 
wrong.”51  Idaho, like South Dakota, places no restrictions on legislators’ 
abilities to alter or repeal enacted initiatives.52  Legislative power lies in 
the hands of the legislature, though “[t]he people reserve to themselves 
the power to propose laws, and enact the same at the polls independent 
of the legislature.”53  In February 2001, only two months after the 1994 
term limits law was unanimously upheld in Rudeen, the state legislature 
declared a legislative emergency and overrode the Governor’s veto to 
repeal the law, despite repeated public support over the course of three 
successive initiative campaigns.54  Governor Kempthorne stated that his 
veto was “a question of process, and the will of the voters cannot be 
ignored and must be protected.”55  Before the repeal, “an estimated 60% 
of local officials were scheduled to be term-limited out of office in 2002 
. . . .  Local officials and their supporters . . . lobbied legislators 
(especially rural ones) to overturn the ban on terms.”56  
Bart Davis, who served as Senate Majority Caucus Chairman in 
2002 during the repeal effort, penned a law review article explaining the 
legislature’s rationale.  Mr. Davis stated in his article that “the legislature 
repealed term limits because it could.  Though brashly stated, the 
legislature substituted its judgment for the will of the people.  Whether 
it should or not, is in the eye of the beholder.”57  Mr. Davis argued that 
the legislature “was in a unique position to see the effects of term limits 
 
 49 Id. at 604. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Bart M. Davis, Idaho’s Messy History with Term Limits: A Modest Response, 52 IDAHO 
L. REV. 463, 466 (2016) (alterations and internal quotations omitted) (citing Mark 
Warbis, Idaho Republicans Seek to End Term Limits, SPOKESMAN-REV., June 25, 2000, at 
B3). 
 52 See IDAHO CONST. art III, § 1; IDAHO CODE § 34-1801 (2019). 
 53 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 54 In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 1064 (Idaho 
2002); Michael Janofsky, Idaho Legislature Repeals Term Limit Law, Undoing Voter-
Approved Measure, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2002, at A13. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Daniel A. Smith, Overturning Term Limits: The Legislature’s Own Private Idaho?, 36 
POL. SCI. & POL. 215, 216 (2003). 
 57 Davis, supra note 51, at 485. 
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in other states, reasonably project those effects in Idaho, and 
understand the damage they would do at the local level.”58  Implicit in 
this argument is that the public could not—and did not—see and 
understand the effects that happened in other states.  They could not, in 
his estimation, make a calculated decision about the long-term effects of 
term limits on political life in Idaho.  Of legislators that voted to repeal, 
only eleven were defeated in the following election, although some were 
defeated as a result of redistricting.59  This does not, however, prove that 
voters were not troubled by the legislative rebuke but instead suggests 
the significant incumbency advantages that term limits were designed 
to protect against.60  
Idaho’s saga with term limits further demonstrates the limited role 
of the judiciary in protecting the will of the people, as expressed in an 
initiative.  Two citizens challenged the legislature’s repeal of the 1994 
Term Limits Act in court.61  The court held not only that the legislature 
was not limited under the Idaho Constitution in terms of its ability to 
repeal enacted initiatives but also that the judiciary may not second-
guess the legislature’s decision to declare a legislative emergency to do 
so.62  The court expressed a generalized skepticism toward engaging the 
“legislative process,” arguing instead that its role is “the determination 
of the constitutionality of action of other branches of government but 
only when the time and circumstances are appropriate.”63  Inherent in 
this decision is a larger problem of how voters may be afforded a remedy 
in cases where their ability to choose their legislators is undermined 
through the legitimate legislative process.  This issue is examined in 




 58 Id. at 485. 
 59 Id. at 491. 
 60 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 61 In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 1065 
(2002).  While the Idaho Supreme Court did not address whether a citizen at large, who 
voted in favor of the repealed initiative, had standing to challenge the repeal, the case 
was allowed to proceed on the basis that another plaintiff was a potential candidate for 
an office held at that time by an incumbent who would be barred from seeking 
reelection, and thus had suffered injury.  Id. 
 62 Id. at 1067 (citing Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129 (Idaho 1987)). 
 63 In re Writ, 92 P.3d at 1067–68. 
 64 See infra Part III. 
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C.  Voting Rights Restoration in Florida 
While initiated statutes are in most cases easily subject to 
legislative amendment or repeal, initiated constitutional amendments, 
at least theoretically, are more difficult for state legislatures to subvert.  
One potential solution to the dynamics at play in South Dakota and 
Idaho may be to enshrine the proposals enacted by initiative and 
legislatively repealed in a constitutional amendment.  But as recent 
events in Florida demonstrate, this strategy is similarly susceptible to 
legislative influence in ways that subvert the initiative’s core purposes.  
Florida is unique among the states examined here in that it does not 
allow initiated state statutes; the only permissible ballot initiatives are 
initiated constitutional amendments.65  Lawmakers cannot directly alter 
the language of constitutional amendments as they would be able to 
amend an approved initiated statute but instead must submit proposed 
amendments to the voters, except where the proposed amendments 
limit the government’s power to raise revenue.66  Even so, lawmakers 
can interpret language in the initiated constitutional amendments in 
order to shape their meaning, as occurred following Amendment 4’s 
ratification. 
In 2018, Florida voters enacted Amendment 4, a constitutional 
amendment designed to automatically restore voting rights to 
individuals with felony convictions, excluding murderers and sex 
offenders, “upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or 
probation.”67  Prior to Amendment 4, felony conviction resulted in 
permanent disenfranchisement unless the Governor chose to restore an 
individual’s rights through clemency.68  Florida’s now-defunct felony 
disenfranchisement law dates back to an era before Reconstruction.69  
As of 2016, the law disenfranchised 21% of Florida’s African American 
voting-age population.70  The Amendment 4 campaign aimed to amend 
 
 65 FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 66 FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 67 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a). 
 68 Erika L. Wood, Florida: An Outlier in Denying Voting Rights, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
3 (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/florida-outlier-
denying-voting-rights. 
 69 Id.  Florida first enacted a felony disenfranchisement law in 1845, before African 
Americans were granted the right to vote.  Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 
1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing the history of felon disenfranchisement in Florida).  
Three years prior, the state enacted Black Codes, which corresponded with an increase 
in prosecution of and higher penalties for crimes the legislature believed were more 
likely to be committed by blacks.  Wood, supra note 68, at 4. 
 70 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & RYAN LARSON, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-
LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 16 (2016), 
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the state constitution to automatically restore the voting rights of 
individuals with felony convictions, excluding murderers and sex 
offenders.71   
In November 2018, over 64% of Floridians voted to amend their 
state constitution and restore the voting rights to those affected by the 
felon disenfranchisement provision.72  The Florida Constitution now 
requires that “any disqualification from voting arising from a felony 
conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon 
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.”73  
Although legislators are bound to respect the voting rights of felons who 
complete their sentences, the amendment itself does not define what 
completing one’s sentence entails.  The legislative response to 
Amendment 4 undermined its core purpose by redefining key terms 
from the initiative’s language.  On May 6, 2019, Governor DeSantis 
signed into law S.B. 7066, which defined the key phrase “completion of 
all terms of sentence” to encompass the payment of all fines and fees 
ordered by a court as part of the sentence or as a condition of 
supervision, including probation, community control, or parole.74  
Voting rights are not restored until all fees, fines, and restitution 
imposed as part of the sentence for a felony conviction are repaid, even 





 71 The actual text of the ballot initiative read:  
No. 4 Constitutional Amendment Article VI, Section 4. Voting 
Restoration Amendment This amendment restores the voting rights 
of Floridians with felony convictions after they complete all terms of 
their sentence including parole or probation.  The amendment would 
not apply to those convicted of murder or sexual offenses, who would 
continue to be permanently barred from voting unless the Governor 
and Cabinet vote to restore their voting rights on a case by case basis.  
Official Sample Ballot, General Election, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.flagler
elections.com/Portals/Flagler/pdfs/2018-General-Sample-Ballot-Mailing.pdf.   
 72 FLA. DEPT. OF STATE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 1. 
 73 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a). 
 74 FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2019).  These conditions are completed, under S.B. 7066, 
only through actual payment, termination of the obligation by the court upon the payee’s 
approval through appearance in court or through notarized consent, or completion of 
all community service hours if the court converts the financial obligation to community 
service.  Id. 
 75 Id.  See also Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2019) 
(“Conversion to a civil lien, usually at the time of sentencing, is a longstanding Florida 
procedure that courts often use for obligations a criminal defendant cannot afford to 
pay.”). 
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At first glance, S.B. 7066 seems to merely interpret the terms of 
Amendment 4, but the context in which its definition of sentence 
“completion” operates dramatically limits the amendment’s practical 
effect relative to voters’ reasonable expectations of voting rights 
restoration.76  Between 1996 and 2012, Florida legislators created 
twenty new categories of legal financial obligations (LFOs), or fines and 
fees imposed by a court for various services, penalties, and mandatory 
surcharges, while simultaneously eliminating exceptions for those 
unable to pay.77  The Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) Chief of 
Admission admitted that FDOC has practically no way of knowing if an 
individual has not repaid financial obligations after their formal 
supervision has been completed.78  The state does not maintain a 
database of LFOs,79 and courts often order individuals to pay restitution 
directly to victims, for which there are no receipts of documentation.80  
The Florida Clerk of the Courts Association expects that 83% of LFOs 
will go unpaid.81  Further, S.B. 7066 does not require courts to assess an 
individual’s ability to pay.82  Individuals who are unable to pay back 
 
 76 See Jones, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1295. 
 77 See Rebekah Diller, The Hidden Cost of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST.  5–7 (March 23, 2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/hidden-costs-floridas-criminal-justice-fees. 
 78 Hearing on the Implementation of Amendment 4 Before Jnt. House Meeting of the 
Criminal J. Subcomm. & the Judiciary Comm. (Fla. 2019), at 1:18, https://theflorida
channel.org/videos/2-14-19-joint-house-meeting-of-the-criminal-justice-
subcommittee-and-the-judiciary-committee.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 54:18. 
 81 See Rivero, supra note 4. 
 82 In a recent court decision, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida issued a narrow preliminary injunction on S.B. 7066 on the basis of inability to 
pay.  See Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1309 (N.D. Fla.  2019), rev’d, 975 F.3d 
1016 (11th Cir. 2020).  The district court applied the injunction only with respect to the 
defendants bringing suit but not to the public at large, holding that “the State of Florida 
cannot deny an individual plaintiff the right to vote just because the plaintiff lacks the 
financial resources to pay.”  Id.  But see Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1056 
(11th Cir. 2020) (Lagoa, J., concurring) (reasoning that felons in Florida “are not 
deprived of reenfranchisement solely based on inability to pay” because S.B. 7066 
provides three alternative avenues for rights restoration: “termination of the obligation 
by the payee; conversion of LFOs to community service hours; and judicial modification 
of the original sentencing order.”).  The district court declined to address core issues 
about the purpose of Amendment 4 as understood by a reasonable voter, deferring to 
the Florida Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion.  Jones, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1291.  The 
Eleventh Circuit ultimately stayed the injunction, reasoning that, despite its procedural 
defects, Amendment 4 and S.B. 7066 do not abridge rights guaranteed by the federal 
Equal Protection Clause, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, or the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1037, 1040, 1049, 1056.  
In doing so, the Court chose not to consider the reasons that voters may actually have 
chosen to enact the law, see text accompanying notes 91–95, and instead imputed other 
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their financial obligations will be disenfranchised as a result of their 
felony convictions.  If over 80% of LFOs go unpaid, and Florida has no 
means to determine who has or has not paid those obligations that are 
actually fulfilled, the restorative effect of Amendment 4 will be 
dramatically limited, contrary to its core purpose.83  
S.B. 7066 interprets Amendment 4 as creating a voting rights 
restoration scheme in which those felons who have the means to pay off 
their LFOs—and only those felons—may have their voting rights 
restored.84  There are also procedural problems with S.B. 7066 that 
undermine the intent of Amendment 4.85  The fees subject to repayment 
under the statute must be documented in the sentencing document 
 
rational justifications for the law’s restrictive interpretation consistent with its ruling, 
Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1035 (“Before extending the franchise to even more felons, 
Florida may have wished to test the waters by reenfranchising only those who complete 
their full sentences.”); id. at 1037 (“[T]he face of the amendment makes clear that 
Florida voters do not share the dissenters’ view that it is unjust to tell some criminals 
that they have incurred debts to society that will never be repaid. . . .  Florida’s voters 
intended only to reenfranchise felons who have been fully rehabilitated, and Senate Bill 
7066 drew a rational line in pursuit of that goal.”); id. at 1057–58 (Pryor, C.J., 
concurring) (“To argue that the purpose of Amendment 4 was to reenfranchise a 
particular percentage of felons that this Court deems acceptable is to ignore the words 
adopted by the people of Florida when they amended their constitution.”).  The Court 
employs the same textualist analysis as the Florida Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion, 
see text accompanying notes 88–95 infra, finding voters’ motivations clear from the text 
of Amendment 4 itself rather than any of the publicity or campaign materials that 
reasonably shaped voters’ expectations as to what they were actually voting for.  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is thus abjectly divorced from the popular perceptions that 
motivated Amendment 4’s enactment in the first place, and so only further erodes the 
will of the electorate by legitimating the legislature’s interpretation of the sentence 
completion requirement. 
 83 This is not the first time that the Florida legislature has employed this strategy to 
undermine voter-initiated constitutional amendments.  In 2016, Florida voters 
approved Amendment 2, now codified as FLA. CONST. art. 10 § 29(d), which allowed 
distribution and use of medical marijuana.  Fla. Dep’t of Health v. People United for Med. 
Marijuana, 250 So. 3d 825, 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).  In 2017, lawmakers passed a 
bill that expressly excluded from the definition of medical use “possession, use, or 
administration of marijuana in a form for smoking.”  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.986(1)(j)(2).  
Though Governor DeSantis ultimately repealed the provision, legalizing the smoking of 
medical marijuana, the litigation faced substantial hurdles as the Florida Court of 
Appeals found that the challengers had not met their burden of showing that the statute 
was facially unconstitutional and vacated the lower court’s stay.  Fla. Dep’t of Health, 250 
So. 3d at 828. 
 84 See Jones, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1297 (arguing that voters likely did not interpret 
Amendment 4 to “condition the right to vote on the payment of fees for representation 
by a public defender.”). 
 85 Indeed, many of these problems are features of the implementing legislation, not 
bugs.  See Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1110–11 (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting) (detailing the 
ways in which the legislature enacted S.B. 7066 with either knowledge or willful 
disregard for the bureaucratic deficiencies surrounding its effective implementation).  
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promulgated by the sentencing court.86  Many counties in Florida, 
however, routinely fail to produce sentencing documents upon request, 
meaning that even if a person believes that they have repaid their LFOs, 
they may be unable to verify that belief and risk voting where they are 
barred from doing so.87  Either in purpose or effect, or both, S.B. 7066 
controverts the voters’ reasonable interpretation of Amendment 4’s 
intent to restore the franchise to individuals with felony convictions.  
These events demonstrate that even a substantive constitutional 
amendment does not insulate voters’ will on electoral reforms from 
legislative revision.  Here, legislators foresaw a sea change in voter 
registration that could have dramatically reshaped the political 
landscape in Florida and, despite Amendment 4’s status as a 
constitutional amendment rather than an ordinary statute, took action 
to limit its political effect.  Florida legislators’ actions further 
demonstrate the proposition that there must be stronger protections in 
place for voters to expand the franchise through election and voting 
reforms without subjecting those reforms to legislators’ perverse 
incentive structures.  
This context makes the Florida Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion 
on Amendment 4’s implementation even more problematic from a 
legislative nullification perspective.  The court found the plain meaning 
of the Amendment’s text to unambiguously include LFOs as a 
prerequisite to voting rights restoration.88  At the outset of its opinion, 
the court explicitly rejected consideration of voter intent as a threshold 
matter for interpreting the provision, despite substantial precedent 
favoring such analysis.89  The court cautioned against examining such 
 
 86 See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a) (2019); Daniel Rivero, Everything You Need to Know 
About Florida’s Amendment 4 Lawsuit, WLRN PUBLIC RADIO AND TELEVISION (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.wlrn.org/post/everything-you-need-know-about-floridas-amendment-
4-lawsuit. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting 
Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2020). 
 89 In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 
599 (Fla. 2012) (applying the “approach that has been consistently undertaken when 
interpreting constitutional provisions”); Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 
1978) (“In construing the Constitution, we first seek to ascertain the intent of the 
framers and voters, and to interpret the provision before us in the way that will best 
fulfill that intent.”); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So.2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960) (“The fundamental 
object to be sought in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of 
the framers and the provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to 
fulfil the intent of the people, never to defeat it.  Such a provision must never be 
construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will of the people to be frustrated 
or denied.”).  But see Edwards v. Thomas, 229 So. 3d 277, 283–84 (Fla. 2017) (pointing 
to the standard recited in Gray but proceeding to first examine the plain text of the 
provision at issue). 
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extrinsic evidence on the basis that it may “shift the focus of 
interpretation from the text and its context to extraneous 
considerations.”90  But the court’s approach, particularly when applied 
to constitutional amendments enacted through popular initiative, is 
more likely to frustrate the original intent behind the law relative to 
ordinary statutory enactments passed through traditional legislative 
procedures.   
The problem with Amendment 4 is that its language does not 
preclude the legislature from acting in this way, nor the court from so 
enshrining a restrictive interpretation of the Amendment’s language 
into state constitutional law.  While S.B. 7066 likely frustrates voters’ 
reasonable understanding of the Amendment as they voted for it, the 
Amendment’s language does not necessarily preclude such an 
interpretation of the “terms” of one’s sentence.91  But “voters are not 
professional lawmakers, so it is problematic to impute to the electorate 
the same knowledge about law, legal terminology, and legislative 
context that courts routinely ascribe . . . to legislators.”92  Taking such a 
strict textualist approach to interpreting ballot initiatives or initiated 
amendments is bound to produce anomalous results where the courts 
are holding voters to the same standards as seasoned legislators.93  
Courts “widely ignore media and advertising as sources of popular 
intent even though . . . research about voter behavior in ballot 
campaigns suggests that voters most regularly consult and seek 
guidance from these sources.”94  Indeed, the parties advocating for a 
broader interpretation of the Amendment point to precisely these types 
of materials to assert that the electorate understood Amendment 4 to 
exclude fines and fees from its requirements.95  Though the Florida 
Supreme Court points to statements made by Amendment 4 sponsors in 
their legal briefs and oral arguments—which it is quick to emphasize 
played no role in their determination of the unambiguous meaning of 
 
 90 Advisory Opinion, 288 So. 3d at 1078. 
 91 See Initial Brief of the Florida House of Representatives at 9–10, Advisory Opinion 
to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 
So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2020) (No. Sc19-1341) (“[C]onsidered in isolation, the phrase ‘terms 
of sentence’ and its component words can take multiple meanings.”). 
 92 Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct 
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110 (1995). 
 93 See Glen Staszewski, The Changing Landscape of Election Law: Essay: Contestatory 
Democracy and the Interpretation of Popular Initiatives, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1165, 1167 
(2013). 
 94 Schacter, supra note 92, at 111. 
 95 Reply Brief for the Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Fla. et al. at 14, Advisory Opinion to 
the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 
3d 1070 (Fla. 2020) (No. Sc19-1341). 
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the Amendment’s text96—it is plausible that these statements and 
intentions are divorced from voters’ reasonable understanding of the 
Amendment as it was proposed and disseminated through mass media.   
Alas, “we are all textualists now.”97  There is no denying that 
Amendment 4 could have been drafted more precisely and that its 
supporters could have avoided tactical errors in discussing the 
Amendment’s scope, both have adversely impacted their success 
challenging S.B. 7066.98  In Florida, as in Idaho, the court acted in a 
manner that did not account for the will of the people and their intent in 
passing the measure in question. 
D.  Lessons Learned from Idaho, South Dakota, and Florida 
By limiting the franchise, legislators restrict who comprises the 
electorate, disproportionately impacting minorities who have been 
subject to disparities inherent in the criminal justice system.99  While 
African Americans represent 13% of Florida’s voting population, more 
than 44% of those registered to vote after the approval of Amendment 
4 but before S.B. 7066 being passed were African American.100  In South 
Dakota, by repealing the campaign finance measures, the legislature 
determined how its members can raise funds for their reelection 
campaigns.  Whereas voters desired to lower the permissible 
contribution limits and establish a system of public financing, 
lawmakers chose a different course that would directly impact how they 
may seek reelection.  In Idaho, voters, again and again, expressed their 
desire to limit the amount of time one powerful person can spend in 
political office.  Legislators said no.  When courts go one step further and 
decline to inquire into voters’ reasonable intent as to initiated statutes 
and amendments, the intent of those reforms is further undermined.  
These choices directly affect voters’ power to freely choose their 
representatives, in the same ways that redistricting threatens to 
 
 96 Advisory Opinion, 288 So. 3d at 1078. 
 97 Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice 
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.  
 98 See Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The 
Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1085–87 (Fla. 2020) (Labarga, J., 
dissenting in part) (concluding that, even after consideration of extrinsic evidence, 
including statements made by Amendment 4’s sponsors in support of the inclusion of 
restitution and fines and fees, Amendment 4 encompasses such considerations within 
the meaning of “all terms of sentence”). 
 99 Kevin Morris, Thwarting Amendment 4, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05_FloridaAmend
ment_FINAL-3.pdf.  
 100 Id. at 1.  
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entrench lawmakers in office against voters’ wishes.  The next Part 
examines current political and legal circumstances that limit voters’ 
ability to push back against legislative nullification without altering the 
balance of legislative power in their favor. 
III.  STATES SHOULD ADOPT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS LIMITING 
LEGISLATURES’ ABILITIES TO NULLIFY VOTING AND ELECTORAL INITIATIVE 
RESULTS 
Regardless of the formal weight given to the electorate’s legislative 
authority vis a vis its state legislature, when it comes to rights and 
processes that substantially affect the legislature’s responsiveness to 
the electorate’s political will, those rights and procedures “must 
nonetheless be protected, strenuously so, because they are critical to the 
functioning of an open and effective democratic process.”101  With a few 
important exceptions, American democracy generally relies on the 
prospect that the person who gets the most votes in an election will go 
on to represent the constituency that elected her.  But what one sees 
with initiatives is quite different; legislatures have assumed a power of 
review over voters’ decisions that is akin to expelling a duly elected 
member of the legislature through majority vote based solely on what 
others think of that person’s policy preferences.  In South Dakota, where 
the legislature essentially declared of its own volition the popular 
campaign finance initiative to be constitutionally suspect, legislators 
began to blur the line between lawmaking and judicial review.102  
Likewise, in Idaho, legislators overruled the repeated affirmations of the 
electorate in support of term limits on state and local officials.   
This Part contends first that the current political environment has 
created conditions and incentive structures that make establishing 
proper guardrails to prevent legislative misbehavior all the more 
important.  Second, this Part asserts that legislative nullification creates 
a generalized public injury with no means of redress.  By repealing 
electoral and voting initiatives, legislatures have at their disposal a 
means of pretextually declaring initiated legislation unconstitutional in 
order to second-guess the judgments of a co-equal legislative body.  
Even where an initiative is of questionable constitutionality, legislatures 
thus take decisions about legality and redress away from the courts and 
prevent their constituents from accessing any substantial remedies in 
 
 101 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980). 
 102 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“When 
Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for 
permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the 
principle of separation of powers.”). 
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light of the existing political dynamics and in favor of pretextual ends.  
To combat these dynamics, states should adopt constitutional 
amendments which procedurally and substantively constrain 
legislators’ freedom to amend or repeal initiated statutes. 
A.  Problematic Politics Necessitate Structural Constitutional 
Changes 
Contrary to traditional assumptions that legislators act in 
accordance with the views of a majority of their constituents, and indeed 
are incentivized to do so based on their desire to be reelected, the 
initiatives examined above lend credence to a second hypothesis:  
incumbency advantages and political structures may, at this moment, be 
so substantial as to alter legislators’ incentives such that they are now 
able to balance the will of their constituencies against a reduced risk of 
being voted out of office given institutional advantages that facilitate 
incumbent reelection.103  The California Constitution expressly 
acknowledges these incentives:  
The people find and declare that the Founding Fathers 
established a system of representative government based 
upon free, fair, and competitive elections.  The increased 
concentration of political power in the hands of incumbent 
representatives has made our electoral system less free, less 
competitive, and less representative. . . .  [U]nfair incumbent 
advantages discourage qualified candidates from seeking 
public office and create a class of career politicians, instead of 
the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding 
Fathers.  These career politicians become representatives of 
the bureaucracy, rather than of the people whom they are 
elected to represent.104 
California explicitly restricts terms, retirement benefits, and state-
financed incumbent staff and support services on this basis.105  
Incumbency in and of itself creates immense advantages for state 
legislators seeking reelection.  In 2015 and 2016, state legislators 
running as incumbents in contested elections, but who lacked a 
 
 103 For example, in 2018, only 14% of incumbent state legislators nationwide who 
faced a primary challenge ultimately lost their seats.  Incumbents Defeated in 2018’s State 
Legislative Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Incumbents_defeated_in_
2018%27s_state_legislative_elections; see also Ciara O’Neill, Money and Incumbency in 
State Legislative Races, 2015 and 2016, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN POLITICS (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/money-incumbency-in-
2015-and-2016-state-legislative-races (finding that 92% of incumbent legislators kept 
their seats in 2015–16 elections). 
 104 CAL. CONST. art IV, § 1.5.  
 105 Id.  
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monetary advantage over their opponent, won their elections in 92% of 
cases.106  This figure does not include the 40% of incumbent legislators 
who ran for their seats unopposed.107  Of sixty-four incumbent South 
Dakota legislators who ran for reelection in 2016, the same election in 
which the public approved a campaign finance and ethics overhaul via 
initiative, sixty, or 94%, were reelected to another term.108  
Other scholars have advanced alternative explanations for 
legislative nullification of majoritarian initiatives, namely that, due to a 
growing urban-rural divide, legislators vote in accordance with the 
views of their constituency while undermining the will of the electorate 
as a whole.109  Daniel A. Smith points to this dynamic to explain Idaho’s 
term limits repeal, in particular, arguing that voters in rural counties 
were “significantly less likely than residents of urban counties to 
support the term limits measure.”110 
It is reasonable that South Dakota voters, in this context, would be 
interested in passing campaign finance and ethics reforms to curb 
legislators’ ability to seek or achieve reelection.  Voters have a 
cognizable interest in limiting lawmakers’ power to “entrench 
themselves in office as against voters’ preferences.”111  Career 
legislators have clear incentives to reject systemic changes that might 
affect their ability to remain in office.  Term limits are the most direct 
example.  As the events in Idaho demonstrate, if given the opportunity 
to obstruct term limits and remain in office, legislators will jump at that 
chance.112  As John H. Ely has argued, “[c]ourts must police . . . political 
activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so: ins have a way 
of wanting to make sure the outs stay out.”113  These interests have been 
on display in recent, high-profile redistricting litigation.114  Legislators 
 
 106 O’Neill, supra note 103. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Daniel A. Smith, Representation and the Spatial Bias of Direct Democracy, 78 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1420 (2007). 
 110 Id. at 1426. 
 111 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 112 See Jerry D. Spangler & Bob Bernick Jr., Utah Senators Vote to Repeal Term-Limits 
Law, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 25, 2003), https://www.deseret.com/2003/2/25/19706340/
utah-senators-vote-to-repeal-term-limits-law (discussing the Utah legislature’s repeal 
of a term limits law that was enacted in order to preempt a ballot initiative on the same 
subject).  Only fifteen states have currently enacted term limits for state legislators, 
though four states had their legislative term limits thrown out by their state supreme 
courts.  The Term-Limited States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (last updated Nov. 12, 
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-
states.aspx. 
 113 ELY, supra note 101, at 106.  
 114 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509.  
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have notoriously taken steps across the country to stack the 
redistricting process in favor of the party in power to the point of 
infringing upon citizens’ right to vote.115 
Though relatively weaker than incumbency advantages, 
candidates who possessed a monetary advantage, but not an 
incumbency advantage, still won 80% of seats.116  Particularly in 
Republican-controlled states, the post-Citizens United campaign finance 
landscape features a significant electoral advantage for state house 
candidates.117  One study showed not only that Citizens United increased 
the odds of victory for Republicans in state house races, but was also 
correlated with a 5% increase in the likelihood that a Republican 
incumbent seeks reelection in those contests.118  The same study found 
a statistically significant correlation between Citizens United and a 
roughly 10% decrease in Democratic candidates entering state house 
races.119  Incumbency and monetary advantages create dynamics where 
even when legislators behave in a manner that a majority of voters 
dislike, such as substantially altering recently enacted initiatives, there 
are still significant barriers to removing those people from office and 
reshaping the state legislature in the image of the electorate.  Incumbent 
support for an initiative that has statewide majority support may even 
benefit the candidate in their own district come time for reelection.120  
The next Section discusses why, given these dynamics, legislatures are 
emboldened to amend, repeal, or redefine initiatives enacted with broad 
support from the electorate.   
 
 115 See id. at 2493 (discussing instances of alleged partisan gerrymandering in 
Maryland and North Carolina); League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 
737, 741 (Pa. 2018); see also Maggie Astor & K.K. Rebecca Li, What’s Stronger than a Blue 
Wave? Gerrymandered Districts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/11/29/us/politics/north-carolina-gerrymandering.html; cf. Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2015) 
(discussing the constitutionality of Arizona’s independent redistricting commission, 
established by initiative to end gerrymandering and improve “voter and candidate 
participation in elections”). 
 116 O’Neill, supra note 103. 
 117 Tilman Klumpp, Hugo M. Mailon & Michael Williams, The Business of American 
Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections, 59 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 3 
(2016) (finding that Citizens United was associated with a 4% increase in the likelihood 
that a Republican is elected in state house races). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Smith, supra note 109, at 1427. 
DODGE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  10:57 PM 
1340 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1317 
B.  Preserving Judicial Review  
In most states, legislators have the power to create new laws and 
amend existing ones.121  But, as demonstrated above,122 legislatures 
have occasionally taken it upon themselves to assess the 
constitutionality of ballot initiatives before the courts have had an 
opportunity to speak on the issues.  Even absent constitutional 
concerns, legislatures are generally free to repeal laws that they dislike 
and replace them with laws they think are better.  In the exercise of 
unified legislative power, this means a legislature merely revisiting 
issues that it has spoken on in the past.  In the context of initiatives, 
however, where legislative power is bifurcated and voters have 
incentives to legislate in areas that their elected representatives find too 
politically charged or where they cannot find consensus, the potential 
for legislative clash is substantial.   
Unlike traditional conflicts between voters and the government, 
where citizens may file suit against the body vested with the power to 
execute a given law, conflicts arising in the context of repeal or 
amendment offer limited remedies for voters whose preferences, as 
expressed through the ballot box, have been undermined through the 
legislative process.  The post-repeal litigation surrounding Idaho’s 1994 
Term Limits Act is an excellent demonstration of how the judiciary 
offers a limited avenue for redress.  Unlike South Dakota, which grants 
voters merely the right to “propose” measures subject to a vote by the 
electorate,123 the Idaho Constitution reserves to the people “the power 
to propose laws, and enact the same at the polls independent of the 
legislature.”124  This independent power is undermined where state law 
vests the legislature with the power to repeal measures passed by 
initiative.125  Proponents of this legislative right argue that the people, 
in response, may merely re-enact the same initiative, or instead elect a 
majority of legislators who support the initiative in question.126  But 
where a legislator’s career is on the line, and the body has already shown 
itself disposed to repealing the measure in question, what reason is 
there to expect a different outcome if a measure were merely re-
enacted?  Further, because voting and electoral reforms are specifically 
examined here, status quo incumbency advantages without voter-
 
 121 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing how states have limited legislatures’ 
abilities to amend laws enacted through initiative). 
 122 See discussion supra Part II. 
 123 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 124 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 125 Luker v. Curtis, 136 P.2d 978, 984 (Idaho 1943) (Holden, C.J., dissenting). 
 126 See id. at 980. 
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approved changes may preclude the election of a more sympathetic 
legislature.  Given the range of issues that voters consider when casting 
their vote, such as who will raise their taxes, who has a better plan for 
their community’s schools, and other issues that directly impact 
community wellbeing, voters may be hesitant to cast their ballot based 
merely on a legislator’s recalcitrance concerning an initiative that a 
given voter may have supported in the past.  Even if some voters may be 
so put off by legislative nullification as to try to unseat offending 
legislators, they face a collective action problem alongside their fellow 
voters in mustering enough support around that single issue to incite a 
response sufficient to overcome incumbency advantages and change the 
makeup of the state legislature.127   
Under these circumstances, voters’ only remaining remedy is the 
courts.  There are numerous problems with relying on the courts in the 
case of legislative nullification.  Repeal, even more than amendment, 
presents a problem without significant means for redress.  First, in 
states like South Dakota that grant voters the power merely to 
“propose” laws,128 there are no constitutional constraints on the 
legislature’s ability to repeal enacted initiatives.129  Voters, presumably, 
would have no cause of action under which to state a claim for relief in 
this scenario.  Even in states like Idaho, which grant initiative power 
“independent of the legislature,” courts have not interpreted that 
phraseology to limit legislative power to repeal enacted initiatives.130   
Second, state standing laws that closely track federal law may bar 
injured voters from seeking relief.131  Though some states, such as South 
Dakota and Florida, allow their supreme courts to issue advisory 
opinions on issues of executive power,132 most states do not allow for 
 
 127 See Anthony Fowler & Andrew B. Hall, Disentangling the Personal and Partisan 
Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits, 9 Q.J. POL. SCI. 
501, 528 (2014) (concluding that incumbency advantages flow specifically to individual 
state legislators rather than their parties at large); Sean Luechtefeld & Adam S. Richards, 
The Interaction of Issue and Image Frames on Political Candidate Assessment, 67 
COMMUNICATION STUDIES 20, 22 (2016) (discussing how “character-focused” messages in 
the media affect voter perceptions of a candidate compared with “issue-framed 
messages). 
 128 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 129 Brendtro v. Nelson, 720 N.W.2d 670, 682 (S.D. 2006) (quoting State ex rel. 
Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W. 707, 709 (S.D. 1915)). 
 130 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 131 For an expansive survey of state-by-state standing requirements, see Wyatt 
Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 349 (2015). 
 132 The South Dakota Supreme Court has defined executive power, for the purpose of 
advisory opinions, as “situations in which the exercise of the Governor’s executive 
power will result in immediate consequences having an impact on the institutions of 
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such opinions devoid of any case or controversy.133  Such standing 
requirements restrict voters, who may not have suffered a unique or 
particularized injury, from obtaining relief.134  For example, though 
Idaho’s state constitution does not contain any “case or controversy” 
requirement akin to that in the federal Constitution, Idaho courts have 
imposed such a requirement on themselves.135  Though the Idaho 
Supreme Court, in In re Writ, found that at least one of the plaintiffs had 
standing, the court relied upon a sole plaintiff’s status as a potential 
challenger to an incumbent who would otherwise have been term-
limited.  With respect to reforms that create only “generalized 
grievance[s] shared by . . . a large class of citizens,” plaintiffs will 
struggle to demonstrate standing.136  Even in cases similar to In re Writ, 
plaintiffs seeking political office suffer an injury, which is not necessarily 
particularized.  In theory, any citizen who wishes to seek public office in 
a district with a would-be term-limited incumbent would suffer the 
same injury.  Just because repeal would impact a given individual’s 
campaign does not mean that it is sufficiently particularized.137  Even 
granting the Idaho Supreme Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff in In re 
Writ had standing, this dilemma puts courts in other states with 
standing requirements modeled after the federal regime in a position to 
 
state government or on the welfare of the public and which involve questions that 
cannot be answered expeditiously through usual adversary proceedings.”  In re Opinion 
of the Supreme Court Relative to the Constitutionality of Chapter 239, Session Laws of 
1977, 257 N.W.2d 442, 447 (S.D. 1977) (Wollman, J., concurring specially). 
 133 See Sassman, supra note 131; see also Scott L. Kafker & David A Russcol, Standing 
at a Constitutional Divide: Redefining State and Federal Requirements for Initiatives After 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. 229, 261–63 (2014) (discussing challenges 
of satisfying Article III standing requirements in the ballot initiative context). 
 134 Generally speaking, initiative petitioners have a right to pre-election standing in 
state courts.  Id. at 251–53.  In contrast, post-passage standing has “not generally been 
included in the state laws governing initiatives.”  Id. at 261 (arguing that post-election 
standing rights should be afforded to initiative petitioners). 
 135 Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 405 P.3d 33, 36 (Idaho 2017) (citing Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe v. Denney, 387 P.3d 761, 766 (Idaho 2015)).  Idaho courts require a petitioner to 
allege injury in fact, Emplrs Res. Mgmt. Co., 405 P.3d at 36, which requires that the injury 
“be ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual and imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical,’” Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 62 (Idaho 2017) (quoting State v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 354 P.3d 187, 194 (Idaho 2015)).  Petitioners must also show “a substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.  
Miles, 778 P.2d at 763.  Standing requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and 
fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged 
conduct.”  Coal for Agric.’s Future v. Canyon Cnty., 369 P.3d 920, 924 (Idaho 2016). 
 136 Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159–60 (Idaho 2002). 
 137 But see In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 
1065 (Idaho 2002) (“The legislature’s repeal impacts her campaign, and she 
demonstrates a particularized and sufficient injury to establish standing.”).  
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avert issues that they feel are legislative in nature easily, and so should 
not be determined by the judicial branch.  
Even in cases where courts choose to grant standing, however, 
legislatures still have distinct advantages.  Both the Term Limits Act in 
Idaho and Measure 22 in South Dakota were repealed through the use 
of declarations of legislative emergency, which allow legislatures to 
amend or repeal laws without those actions being subject to 
referendum.  Legislatures vested with the power to declare such 
emergencies essentially have the power to place decisions to repeal or 
amend enacted initiatives beyond reproach from the voters.138  While 
courts could step in to review declarations of legislative emergency 
more aggressively, they have generally hesitated to do so.139  In Idaho, 
“the legislature’s determination of an emergency . . . is a policy decision 
exclusively within the ambit of legislative authority, and the judiciary 
cannot second-guess that decision.”140  In South Dakota, legislators were 
able to avoid judicial review of the emergency clause.  South Dakota 
courts defer to legislative determinations of emergencies so long as the 
declaration can, “by any fair inference,”141 be “necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of 
the state government and its existing public institutions.”142  H.B. 1069, 
the bill that repealed Measure 22, merely parrots this language and 
provides no supporting reasons why a declaration of emergency was 
necessary other than that it was “necessary for the support of the state 
government and its existing public institutions.”143  
The exception to these dynamics is Amendment 4 in Florida, which, 
by virtue of its status as a constitutional amendment, is not easily 
altered.  The Florida legislature faces more significant barriers to 
undermining Amendment 4’s purpose because it must either act within 
a reasonable interpretation of the provision such that the law would not 
be subject to constitutional attack or amend the constitution through 
traditional processes.  But, as the Amendment 4 saga demonstrates, this 
 
 138 See Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1133 (declining to review the 
legislature’s decision to declare an emergency based on “[t]he respect due to the co-
equal and independent legislative branch of state government and the need for finality 
and certainty about the status of a duly enacted statute”). 
 139 In re Writ, 92 P.3d at 1067–68; see also State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 154 N.W. 
707, 711 (S.D. 1915). 
 140 Leroy, 718 P.2d at 1136. 
 141 In re Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constr. of H.B. 1388 as Amended by 
H.B. 1389, 387 N.W.2d 239, 242 (S.D. 1986). 
 142 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 143 H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017) (codified as Campaign 
Finance Repeal and Revise, 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 72 §§ 1–2 185). 
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does not necessarily leave newly restored voting rights untouchable by 
legislation that narrowly interprets its language, nor protected by the 
state supreme court.  Even without repeal or amendment, S.B. 7066 had 
the effect of dramatically altering the potential composition of the 
electorate based solely on legislators’ preferences.  Lawmakers were no 
less able to engage in a weighted political calculus, balancing the risk of 
losing reelection versus potential benefits of shaping the electorate and 
increasing already substantial incumbency advantages. 
Modern political dynamics and the limited redress available to 
voters through the courts make structural protections on enacted 
initiatives all the more important to protecting voter intent.  Voters are 
less able—and often less willing—to vote their incumbent legislators 
out of office.  Incumbency and monetary advantages create such 
profound electoral handicaps for legislators that the incentive to act in 
favor of the majority will is lessened.  As Idaho’s experience with term 
limit repeal demonstrates, even after legislators willfully flaunt the 
desires of a majority of voters, the consequences may be minimal for 
those who voted against their constituents’ expressed desires.144  
Creating structural protections for voting and electoral reforms 
constrains legislators’ abilities to act anti-democratically in their self-
interest by limiting the franchise, lowering ethical standards, or relaxing 
campaign finance restrictions in the face of opposition from voters.  The 
next Part examines different approaches that protect voter-enacted 
initiatives against legislative self-interest.  
IV.  EVALUATING APPROACHES FOR FAITHFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF VOTING AND 
ELECTORAL REFORMS 
The political and legal dynamics outlined above emphasize the 
need not merely for state constitutional enshrinement of priorities set 
forth in nullified initiatives but also for systemic protections for voters’ 
initiative power in states that feature a constitutional right to initiative.  
While initiated constitutional amendments seeking policy ends 
themselves have traditionally been used to sidestep self-interested 
legislators who perceive them as a threat to their political careers,145 
these substantive amendments are themselves susceptible to the same 
types of sabotage as Amendment 4 in Florida.  By conferring the right 
itself, rather than protections against the legislature’s ability to alter 
that right in the future, substantive amendments are susceptible to 
 
 144 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 145 John Dinan, Symposium: Law & Politics in the Age of Direct Democracy: State 
Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 19 CHAP. 
L. REV. 61, 76 (2016). 
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legislative tampering that rely on existing safeguards under the law.  As 
South Dakota and Idaho demonstrate, these safeguards can fall short of 
protecting the will of the electorate.  In contrast, what this Comment will 
call “means-oriented” amendments provide the electorate with a lower 
electoral bar to clear to enact policy change while creating potentially 
higher legislative barriers to amendment.  Means-oriented amendments 
can include procedural protections as well as protective substantive 
standards that limit the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal an 
initiated law.  Particularly with respect to the 19 states that allow for 
initiated constitutional amendments, whether direct or indirect, means-
oriented amendments in this vein may be the most promising avenue to 
ensure that future statutory initiatives remain intact.146  While means-
oriented initiatives may be subject to some of the same vulnerabilities 
as substantive amendments, they protect future substantive 
amendments from legislative attack.  This Part outlines approaches that 
different states have taken concerning means-oriented amendments 
that limit legislative capacity to amend enacted initiatives.  
Means-oriented amendments offer two key benefits for the people 
in successfully implementing reforms that counter legislators’ perverse 
incentives.  First, they offer direct protection against repeal and 
amendment that would threaten the core purposes of initiated voting 
and electoral reforms.  Second, once in place, this type of amendment 
allows the electorate not only to vote their respective legislators out of 
office—a challenge that, given existing incumbent advantages, is 
difficult to surmount—but also to threaten implementation of electoral 
and voting reforms through a strengthened initiative process with a 
higher bar for legislative amendment or repeal.  This threat, even if not 
carried out, provides voters with a powerful tool to pressure legislators 
to act in majoritarian ways. 
Beyond the context of voting and electoral initiatives, states have 
implemented different procedural and substantive constraints on their 
legislature’s ability to amend enacted initiatives generally.  In terms of 
procedural constraints, some states have imposed supermajority 
requirements on legislatures attempting unilaterally to amend 
implemented initiatives.147  Other states employ restrict how soon after 
 
 146 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM STATES (Jan. 
18, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-
initiative-states.aspx. 
 147 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 1, § 1(6)(C) (three-fourths vote in each house); ARK. CONST. 
art. V, § 1 (two-thirds of each house); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (three fourths vote in each 
house); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2 (two-thirds of unicameral legislature); N.D. CONST. art. III, 
§ 8 (two-thirds of each house); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 41 (two-thirds of each house for 
first two years after enactment). 
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passage the legislature may amend an initiative.148  Only two states, 
California and Arizona, currently have voter approval requirements, 
which require amendments to approved initiatives to be approved via a 
second initiative.149  Unlike California, which requires voter approval 
unless otherwise stipulated in the initiative itself, Arizona allows for 
unilateral legislative amendment so long as the amendment “furthers 
the purposes” of the measure and passes with a three-fourths 
supermajority in both houses of the legislature.150  The Arizona 
legislature can also submit proposed amendments to enacted initiatives 
to the voters through legislatively referred ballot initiatives.  What this 
Comment calls the “furthers the purpose” standard is a more 
substantive constraint that requires the legislature to consider the will 
of the voters when amending a statute enacted by initiative.  These 
substantive and procedural constraints are often used in combination, 
as in Arizona, to set a substantially higher bar for amending initiated 
statutes.  These constraints create a category of laws that require broad 
legislative support—a rare thing in today’s hyperpartisan political 
climate—to alter.  
In 1998, Arizona voters passed the Voter Protection Act (VPA), 
which amended their state constitution by way of initiative to limit how 
legislatures may amend successfully enacted initiatives.  Prior to 
enactment, legislators could amend approved initiatives “by a majority 
vote . . . [unless] that ballot measure was approved by a majority of the 
people . . . registered to vote in [Arizona], rather than by a majority of 
the people who voted on the ballot measure.”151  The VPA amended the 
Arizona Constitution to restrict legislative changes to those that 
“further[] the purpose” of the initiative.152  This provision prohibits the 
 
 148 ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 (two years to repeal, can amend immediately); NEV. CONST. 
art. IXX, § 2 (three years before legislature can repeal, amend, annul, or suspend); N.D. 
CONST. art. III, § 8 (seven years before repeal or amendment, except with two-thirds vote 
of each house); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 41 (two-thirds of each house for first two years 
after enactment); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(f) (two years before repeal but may be 
amended immediately). 
 149 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c); see also Legislative 
Alteration, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_alteration. 
 150 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C); see also Lisa T. Hauser, The Powers of Initiative 
and Referendum: Keeping the Arizona Constitution’s Promise of Direct Democracy, 44 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 567, 586 n.129 (2012). 
 151 Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election Ballot Measures, Proposition 105 
Analysis by Legislative Council 47, https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/Pub
Pamphlet/prop105.html.   
 152 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C) (“The legislature shall not have the power to 
amend an initiative measure approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, or to 
amend a referendum measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon, unless 
the amending legislation furthers the purposes of such measure and at least three-
DODGE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  10:57 PM 
2021] COMMENT 1347 
legislature from repealing the approved initiative,153 prevents the 
Governor from vetoing approved initiatives,154 and creates a new 
amendment process that binds legislators in terms of the degree to 
which they may amend the initiative without voter approval.155  To 
amend any initiative, even where the amendment would further its 
purpose, a three-fourths vote by the state legislature is required.156  
Substantive changes must be submitted to voters through legislatively 
referred state statute, while changes that are in line with the initiative’s 
purpose can be approved without voter approval, albeit with the 
substantial three-fourths majority.157  A three-fourths majority is also 
required to appropriate or transfer funds that were designated by the 
initiative in question; any appropriation of funds must further the 
purposes of the initiative.158  Unlike an alternative proposal, the VPA did 
not prohibit the state legislature from using emergency legislation to 
enact changes to an approved initiative.159   
California, notorious for its use of initiatives and referenda, affords 
its legislators even less power to amend enacted initiatives.160  The 
legislature may only repeal or amend initiatives with the electorate’s 
approval if the initiative in question expressly stipulates an alternate 
means by which the statute might be amended.161  California courts 
 
fourths of the members of each house of the legislature, by a roll call of ayes and nays, 
vote to amend such measure.”); see also Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election 
Ballot Measures, Proposition 105 Analysis by legislative Council 47, 
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/PubPamphlet/prop105.html. 
 153 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(B); Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election 
Ballot Measures, Proposition 105 Analysis by legislative Council 47, 
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/PubPamphlet/prop105.html.  
 154 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(A). 
 155 Id. at § 1(6)(C); see also Hauser, supra note 150, at 586 n.129. 
 156 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C). 
 157 Id. at § 1(6)(D). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Arizona Sec’y of State, 1998 General Election Ballot Measures, Proposition 104 
Analysis by Legislative Council 37, https://apps.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/Pub
Pamphlet/prop104.html.  In Arizona, emergency legislation, which includes “laws 
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or for 
the support and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 
institutions,” requires a two-thirds vote in each house of the state legislature as well as 
the Governor’s signature and is not subject to referendum, where voters could 
otherwise directly overturn the legislation by popular vote.  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, 
§ 1(3). 
 160 In California, “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.”  CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
Legislative power is vested in the state legislature, “but the people reserve to themselves 
the powers of initiative and referendum.”  CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 161 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal a referendum 
statute.  The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute 
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liberally construe the people’s power of initiative,162 assuming a duty to 
“jealously guard the precious initiative power, and to resolve any 
reasonable doubts in favor of its exercise.”163  In California, courts 
presume that the legislature acted lawfully and within its authority and 
uphold legislative acts that amend an enacted initiative “if, by any 
reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the 
purposes of [the initiative.]”164 “This power is absolute and includes the 
power to enable legislative amendment subject to conditions attached 
by the voters.”165  On its own, the state legislature lacks the power to 
amend initiatives.166  Californians have regularly used this process to 
sidestep traditional legislative processes and pass (sometimes 
contradictory)167 initiatives that may not be amended without the 
people’s consent.168   
Unlike South Dakota and Idaho, where the legislatures acted 
reasonably quickly to repeal laws that they found undesirable, 
California tried—and failed—in 2016 to amend a law passed by 
initiative nearly thirty years earlier.  1988 Proposition 73 (Prop. 73) 
amended the Political Reform Act of 1974 to prohibit public funding of 
political campaigns.169  Prop. 73 limited gifts to elected officials,170 
 
that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute 
permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.”). 
 162 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 
1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978). 
 163 Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 164 Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Cal. 1995). 
 165 California Common Cause v. Fair Political Practices Com., 269 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876 
(Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis omitted). 
 166 People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 211 (Cal. 2010). 
 167 1988 California Primary Election Ballot. Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Elec. (June 7, 
1988), p. 14, 34 [hereinafter 1988 Cal. Primary Voter Information Guide].  Both 
Proposition 73 and Proposition 68 though contradictory in nature, were simultaneously 
approved by California voters.  In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political 
Practices Comm’n., 799 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme Court held 
that “when two or more measures are competing initiatives, either because they are 
expressly offered as ‘all-or-nothing’ alternatives or because each creates a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme related to the same subject, . . . only the provisions of 
the measure receiving the highest number of affirmative votes will be enforced.” 
 168 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative 
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors 
unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ 
approval.”); Kelly, 222 P.3d at 211 (“[T]he legislature is powerless to act on its own to 
amend an initiative statute.”); Amwest, 906 P.2d at 1122 (rejecting argument that 
initiatives may be amended to say “what the voters thought it meant”).  
 169 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Newsom, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 
2019)  
 170 Id. at 109 (citing Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Elec. (June 7, 1988), analysis of Prop. 
73 by Legis. Analyst, p. 33). 
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“proposed establishing limits of campaign contributions for all 
candidates for state and local elective office, and prohibiting the use of 
public funds for campaign expenditures and newsletters and mass 
mailings.”171  “Most important of all” was the restriction of public 
financing of campaigns, which aimed to keep tax dollars out of 
politicians’ hands.172  Despite extensive litigation,173 Prop. 73’s 
restrictions on the use of public funds remained in effect through 2016 
when legislators attempted to amend the provision to allow public 
campaign funding.174  Unlike South Dakota and Idaho, this is an instance 
where the will of the voters withstood legislative efforts to undo the 
restrictions placed on California’s electoral system by initiative because 
of the unique restraints that California places on legislative alteration of 
ballot initiatives, in contrast to the twenty-three other states that allow 
ballot initiatives.  
Prop. 73 itself provides two methods in the text of the initiative for 
amendment or repeal.  The law may be amended “by a statute to ‘further 
its purposes’ passed in each house by two-thirds vote . . . and signed by 
the Governor[,]”175 or “by a statute that becomes effective only when 
approved by the electors.”176  In September 2016, Governor Jerry Brown 
signed Senate Bill 1107 (S.B. 1107), which repealed Prop. 73’s 
prohibition on accepting public funds to seek office.177  S.B. 1107 was 
challenged on the basis that it was an “improper legislative amendment 
of a voter initiative.”178  For the California legislature to amend Prop. 73 
without voter approval, it must pass the amending bill with two-thirds 
of each house, and the amendment must reasonably “further[] the 
purposes of the Act.”179  In Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn v. Newsom, the 
California Supreme Court held that S.B. 1107 did not further the 
 
 171 1988 Cal. Primary Voter Information Guide, supra note 167, at 32. 
 172 Id. at 34. 
 173 See Service Emp. Int’l. v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n., 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that Prop. 73’s contribution limits, among other provisions, were 
unconstitutional); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n., 863 P.2d 694, 700 (Cal. 
1993) (holding that Prop. 73’s ban on publicly funded mass mailings was severable from 
the measure’s unconstitutional provisions, and thus still in effect).  
 174 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85300(b) (2016). 
 175 Howard Jarvis, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 109 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 81012(a)). 
 176 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 177 Id. at 108 
 178 Id. at 108. 
 179 Id. at 113–14 (citing Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Cal. 
1995)).  This standard is popular among California initiative amendment clauses.  See, 
e.g., Official Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 5, 
at 145.  Other California initiatives have used different language, such as “expand the 
scope” of the initiative.  See Cty. of San Diego v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 240 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 52, 64 (Cal. 2018). 
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purposes of Prop. 73, but controverted the Proposition’s purposes by 
eliminating the ban on public campaign financing that was at the core of 
the initiative.180  Historical context, ballot arguments in favor of the 
initiative, and express statements of purpose in the act can each serve 
as evidence of an initiative’s purpose, as can the initiative’s plain text.181  
California courts have invalidated amendments for contravening a law’s 
principal purpose where the amendments took substantially different 
policy approaches from the law being amended.182  S.B. 1107 was invalid 
because it was not amended in one of the two ways that Prop. 73 
expressly allows.183  The bill took a “significantly different policy 
approach” to campaign reform than did the Political Reform Act, and so 
was invalid because it conflicted with a primary mandate of the law.184  
This process of judicial review demonstrates one way in which 
states can safeguard the will of voters with respect to electoral reforms.  
Even thirty years later, voters’ expressed desire that their tax dollars not 
go toward political campaigns constrained how the state legislature 
could govern.  The mere fact that voters can reliably bring suit to 
challenge amendments made to laws passed by initiative demonstrates 
another key benefit to this type of check on legislative power.  As Julian 
Eule has argued, courts must play a larger role in resolving questions 
that arise in the course of direct democracy, “not because direct 
democracy is unconstitutional, nor because it frequently produces 
legislation that we may find substantively displeasing or short-sighted, 
but because the judiciary stands alone in guarding against the evils 









 180 Howard Jarvis, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118. 
 181 Id. at 114–15 (citing Amwest, 906 P.2d at 1120). 
 182 Gardner v. Schwarzenegger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 239 (Ct. App. 2009).  The court 
emphasized that the amendment must further the purposes of the Political Reform Act 
of 1973 as a whole, not merely the amendments made through Prop. 73.  Howard Jarvis, 
252 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 115. 
 183 Id. at 117. 
 184 Id. at 118. 
 185 Eule, supra note 11, at 1525 (arguing that courts, as the de facto adjudicator of 
initiatives, should exercise a lesser degree of judicial restraint in so adjudicating). 
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V.  IMPLEMENTING MEANS-ORIENTED AMENDMENTS TO PROTECT VOTING AND 
ELECTORAL REFORMS 
Based on the above discussion, this Comment proposes that states, 
and specifically voters who reside in states with substantial initiative 
powers, should seek to amend their respective constitutions to institute 
procedural and substantive constraints on their legislatures’ power to 
amend and repeal initiated statutes governing voting and electoral 
reforms.  This Part first examines the benefits and drawbacks of 
allowing for a substantive component such as the “further the purpose” 
standard.  This Part also addresses implementation challenges in states 
that have initiated constitutional amendment procedures and those that 
do not.   
This Comment takes no position on precisely which combination of 
procedural constraints each state should adopt; voters should 
determine for themselves the level of protection they desire against 
legislative interference in electoral schemes.  Differently constructed 
procedural schemes can have diverse benefits.  Adopting, for example, 
time constraints alone would allow the electorate a set amount of time 
to elect new representatives under their proposed electoral regime 
before legislators could repeal or amend those new rules at will.  This 
could serve as a trial period for new laws while still allowing voters 
substantially greater power to determine how they elect their 
respective legislators.  In contrast, adopting supermajority 
requirements would (perhaps indefinitely) require broad consensus 
among legislators to reverse or alter changes made by the electorate 
directly, but would still grant elected representatives some degree of 
freedom to revisit those laws.  
The question of voter approval presents notable benefits alongside 
troubling challenges.  Voter approval requirements, with or without 
accompanying substantive qualifications on those requirements, 
strengthen voters’ effective veto power over their representatives.  
These requirements serve as a direct check on legislators’ own 
incentives to promote policies that facilitate their remaining in office.186  
At the same time, legislatures are less able to make incremental 
adjustments to electoral regimes in the face of changing circumstances.  
Voter approval requirements for voting and electoral laws would pose 
less proximate harm to good governance in the short- and medium-run 
than would imposing similar constraints in more rapidly changing areas 
of governance, such as taxation schemes, spending programs, and the 
like.  Whereas governments may suddenly be faced with new areas that 
 
 186 See discussion supra Part IV. 
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require funding, the types of demographic shifts that necessitate 
electoral reform happen more slowly.  Indeed, the federal Constitution 
requires a federal census for redistricting only every ten years.187  
Particularly where the threshold for voter approval is lower than for 
legislative amendment, such restrictions may also cause special interest 
groups to send repetitive, confusing, or contradictory initiatives to the 
public for a vote.  California has struggled with this issue, with courts 
having to conclude that where contradictory initiatives are 
simultaneously approved, only the initiative receiving the highest 
number of votes goes into effect.188  To limit the complications that come 
with strict voter approval, states may be best served by allowing 
legislatures some degree of freedom to amend legislation based on 
substantive criteria or where the body can meet a sufficiently high 
threshold of support.  
Crucially, any proposed amendment in this vein should exempt 
electoral and voting initiatives from being subject to legislative 
emergency powers.  Perceived unconstitutionality or policy 
disagreements should not be hidden under a veil of legislative 
emergency to exempt changes to state electoral systems from being 
maintained by voters as they exist.  As Kristen L. Fraser has argued, 
“[n]otwithstanding criticism from advocates of referendum rights,” no 
legal violation arises where a legislature justifies application of the 
emergency clause based on the vague criteria set forth in their state 
constitution.189  Some states regularly employ such clauses to effectively 
abrogate the People’s power of referendum, or their ability to vote on 
an act of the legislature.190  South Dakota and Idaho both resorted to this 
tactic to undermine initiated laws and amendments that affected 
legislators’ ability to maintain power.191  South Dakota voters were 
unable to muster the votes to enshrine the repealed campaign finance 
and ethics provisions into its state constitution via initiative.192  It was 
 
 187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 188 Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pl. Practices Com., 799 P.2d 1220, 
1221 (Cal. 1990). 
 189 Kristin L. Fraser, Grasping for the “Elephant in the Courthouse”: Developments in 
Washington’s Law of Law-Making, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 490 (2008). 
 190 Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing by Initiative: Structuring the Ballot 
Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 65 n.76 (1995) 
(discussing how Colorado has used the emergency clause invoking the public safety 
exception to prevent any referendums by citizen petition). 
 191 H.B. 1069, 2017 Leg., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017) (codified as Campaign Finance Repeal 
and Revise, 2017 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 72 §§ 1–2 185); In re Writ of Mandamus And/Or for 
Writ of Prohibition, 92 P.3d 1063, 1064 (Idaho 2002). 
 192 Trevor Mitchell & Shelly Conlon, Voters Reject Tobacco Tax Hike, Support Limiting 
Out-of-State Money for Ballot Initiatives, ARGUS LEADER (NOV. 7, 2018), https://www.argus
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precisely these legislative emergency powers that kept Idaho voters 
from obtaining redress in state court.193  While there should be some 
meaningful check on an insulated initiative power, legislatures have 
abused their emergency powers, and will continue to, in order to 
dispose of voter-made law that they dislike.194  Constitutionally 
speaking, there is less harm done to voters if the laws are left on the 
books and challenged in the courts. 
Including a substantive constraint like the “furthers the purpose” 
standard on the legislature allows for flexibility while promoting an 
active role for the courts in this context.  Allowing legislatures to amend 
and revise such initiatives—with broad consensus—is one way to 
ensure that initiated electoral reforms are clear, concrete, and 
enforceable.  Courts would provide voters recourse, estopping any 
attempt to undermine the initiated laws.  To determine voters’ 
reasonable interpretations of the core purpose of the initiative—rather 
than just the stated purpose of the initiatives’ framers and court 
advocates195—California courts, for example, look at historical context, 
ballot arguments in favor of the initiative, express statements of 
purpose in the Act, and the initiative as a whole to determine voter 
intent.196  California’s ballot pamphlets and advertising materials are 
readily available online.197  In considering the purpose of an initiative, 
Arizona courts similarly consider “statements of findings passed with 
the measure as well as other materials in the Secretary of State’s 
publicity pamphlet available to all voters before a general election.”198  
In both states, the materials that courts consider in determining voter 
intent are limited to those available to voters when they voted on the 
initiative.  Courts should also be more open to evidence of mass media 
representations of an initiative’s meaning, as the electorate is 
disproportionately influenced by these materials relative to the more 





 193 See In re Writ, 92 P.3d at 1068. 
 194 See, e.g., Collins & Oesterle, supra note 190, at 65 n.76. 
 195 See Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1296 (N.D. Fla.  2019) (arguing that 
oral arguments made by the initiative’s proponents in court as to its purposes were not 
dispositive). 
 196 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Newsom, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 114 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2019) (citing Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Cal. 1995)). 
 197 California Ballot Measures, U.C. HASTINGS LAW LIBRARY, https://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/ballot-measures/resources-and-historical-information. 
 198 Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 212 P.3d 805, 809 (Ariz. 2009). 
 199 See Schacter, supra note 92, at 111. 
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Finally, as the events in Florida demonstrate, means-seeking 
amendments should have language that constrains not only the 
legislature but also the courts in how they might interpret voting and 
electoral reforms.  Means-seeking amendments should attempt to 
ensure that courts avoid unanticipated consequences of ballot 
initiatives that voters may not have reasonably intended.  As Staszewski 
has argued: 
[C]ourts should . . . narrowly construe ambiguous ballot 
measures when the potential collateral consequences of a 
proposal were not readily apparent to voters, and the 
substantive merits of a particular course of action were 
therefore not subject to reasoned deliberation, particularly 
when the interests or perspectives of the individuals or 
groups who would be adversely affected by a proposed 
understanding of the law were not considered during the 
lawmaking process.200 
By coupling the “furthers the purpose” standard with a broad 
presumption in favor of voter intent, courts would be less likely to 
interpret electoral initiatives in a way that results in unintended 
consequences, as occurred in Florida.  This presumption should apply 
with extra force where the underlying intent of an initiative was to 
expand the franchise or constrain legislative behavior.  Such an 
approach would prevent results analogous to the Florida Supreme 
Court’s Advisory Opinion on Amendment 4, which narrowly construed 
an extremely broad term in the state constitution.201   
In states that allow initiated constitutional amendments, the 
adoption process for this kind of constitutional amendment is 
straightforward.  Voters may sidestep the legislature and directly 
amend their constitutions just as they would pass a normal initiative, 
albeit with a higher threshold for approval.202  In states that allow 
initiated state statutes but not constitutional amendments—Idaho is 
one example—citizens face a heavier lift to convince their legislators to 
cede control over electoral and voting laws to the people.  Perhaps a 
more effective strategy in these states would be to first advocate for the 
adoption of constitutional amendment by initiative, which would create 
 
 200 Staszewski, supra note 93, at 1174. 
 201 Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting 
Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020). 
 202 Of the states that allow for initiated state statutes, only five do not allow initiated 
constitutional amendments: Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  Initiative 
and Referendum States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-
states.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
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the process by which the people could enact these changes.  Finally, in 
states that allow for constitutional amendment by initiative but not 
initiated statutes, voters need only grant themselves the power of 
legislation-by-initiative alongside the protections discussed here.203  
One unavoidable critique of this proposal is the potential for abuse 
of this insulated initiative power to abuse minority rights and further 
disenfranchisement.  While electoral and voting laws are, in most cases, 
subject to the whim of self-interested legislators, legislators can also 
serve as a safety valve against attempts by a majority of voters to limit 
minority rights.  Poor and minority communities are already likely to be 
underrepresented in the legislature, but new and increasing barriers to 
accessing the ballot box create unique problems when it comes to 
governing through initiative.204  Voter ID laws, partisan redistricting, 
felon disenfranchisement, and a systematic elimination of polling sites 
create barriers for entire communities to participate in the electoral 
process, including by facilitating underrepresentation in their 
respective state legislatures.205  If those whose rights are being limited 
have less access to the ballot in the first place, initiatives will only 
further undermine their electoral standing.  More easily than Florida 
voters amended their state constitution to restore felon voting rights, 
other states without felon disenfranchisement laws could enact statutes 
by initiative that effectively strip thousands, if not millions, of people of 
the right to vote.  These risks should not be taken lightly.  Subjecting 
legislative amendment or repeal of such laws to voter approval could 
facilitate a literal tyranny of the majority, denying voting rights to some 




 203 In some states, this may require two separate constitutional amendments because 
of Single Subject laws, which limit the focus of constitutional amendments by initiative 
to one subject.  For a discussion on the Single Subject rule, see Rachel Downey, Michelle 
Hargrove & Vanessa Locklin, Direct Democracy: A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as 
Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004). 
 204 Eule, supra note 11, at 1515. 
 205 Feldman v. Reagan, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016) (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Minority voters encountered significant burdens in exercising their right to vote.  The 
reduced number of polling places meant that voters had to wait hours in line to cast 
ballots.”); Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion 
of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 109 (2013); Voter Identification 
Requirements | Voter ID Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2020), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx; Christopher 
Ingram, Thousands of Polling Places were Closed Over the Past Decade. Here’s Where., 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/
26/thousands-polling-places-were-closed-over-past-decade-heres-where. 
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Despite these risks, citizens rarely enact initiatives that expressly 
discriminate against protected minorities, but more frequently block 
government efforts to assist minorities.206  In this vein, one study shows 
that initiatives have historically been used for “reform” purposes, 87% 
of which have been “inclusive” rather than “exclusive.”207  Another study 
comparing legislation passed through direct democracy as compared 
with representative democracy showed that while states with more 
robust direct democracy regimes did, in fact, enact anti-minority 
proposals at a higher rate than did state without direct democracy, the 
overall passage rate was relatively modest.208   
Redistricting initiatives in the 20th century were sometimes used to 
establish more equally apportioned legislative districts than the 
legislators themselves had drawn.209  In 2000, Arizona voters approved 
an initiative that created an independent legislative redistricting 
commission that takes legislative apportionment out of the hands of 
both voters and their legislators.210  Because the independent 
commission is subject to the VPA, it has an additional level of 
independence that stems from the high threshold for amendments to its 
enabling.  The legislature is required to make “necessary 
appropriations” for the independent commission’s operation but may 
“submit nonbinding recommendations” for how districts should be 
drawn.211  For any proposed legislation that seeks to undermine the 
independent commission’s core purposes, the Arizona legislature must 
turn to the voters. 
When the people act on their own to create electoral and voting 
reforms, the potential for misbehavior and trampling on minority rights 
is admittedly greater.  The “furthers the purpose” standard does not 
offer much substantive protection against anti-minority policies and 
indeed may serve to insulate anti-majority policies against correction by 
elected representatives.  But the “furthers the purpose” standard, in 
conjunction with a legislative override provision, would give well-
meaning legislators the ability to check the electorate’s anti-minority 
 
 206 KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 142–44 (2009). 
 207 RICHARD BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 65–69 (2004) 
 208 Daniel C. Lewis, Bypassing the Representational Filter? Minority Rights Policies 
Under Direct Democracy Democratic Institutions in the U.S. States, 11 ST. POL. POL’Y Q. 198, 
209 (2011).  The study found that direct democracy states enacted 20% of anti-minority 
proposals, compared with 10% in representative democracy states.  Id. at 204–05.  
 209 MILLER, supra note 206, at 151–52. 
 210 Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 
(2015). 
 211 Id. 
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proposals.  This problem is not, however, limited to or a result of the 
remedy proposed in this Comment.  Instead, anti-minority proposals 
that garner sufficient support within the electorate may be sustained 
even in the face of the most aggressive legislative nullification.   
In states that allow for both initiated statutes and constitutional 
amendments, a majority that feels as though its legislature has 
unreasonably undermined its anti-minority wishes can attempt to 
enshrine those same policies in the state constitution.212  Indeed, this 
dynamic was on display as South Dakota voters voted on Constitutional 
Amendment W in response to the legislature’s repeal of Measure 22.213  
Though Constitutional Amendment W was ultimately rejected,214 its 
presence on the ballot illustrates the steps that voters will take to push 
back against nullifying legislators.  Particularly on high-profile issues 
like voting rights, it may be that legislative nullification or alteration to 
protect minority rights, ultimately, undermines those rights by causing 
backlash and instigating a constitutional amendment to subvert those 
rights, as occurred in South Dakota.  In this way, legislative nullification 
does not serve as an effective roadblock for anti-minority policies where 
voters are vested with the initiative power.  This proposal does not solve 
the anti-minority problems that are inherent in direct democracy.  
Instead, it attempts to reshape direct democracy so that, while anti-
minority concerns sustain, initiatives can be one tool for minority 
groups, alongside a coalition of sympathetic voters, to establish more 
robust protections for their political rights. 
Legislative nullification is being used to roll back progressive 
reforms that expand the franchise, create stricter ethics and campaign 
finance laws, and otherwise reform states’ voting and electoral systems.  
The ballot initiative, with proper protection, can be a powerful tool to 
wrest control over states’ governance schemes and enshrine 
protections for underrepresented groups to ensure free and fair 
elections well into the future.  While there is certainly potential for 
misuse of the initiative power, curtailing legislatures’ abilities to amend 
or nullify popularly enacted legislation creates a path for citizens to 
push back against attempts to subvert the popular will.  By amending 
 
 212 For example, in 1996, California voters amended the state constitution through 
Proposition 209 to prohibit government affirmative action programs in public 
employment, education, and contracting, to the extent that the programs gave 
preferential treatment based on “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”  CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 31. 
 213 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 214 South Dakota Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-south-
dakota-elections.html. 
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their constitutions to protect voting and electoral reforms enacted 
through initiative, voters can take back influence that relaxed campaign 
finance regulations and increasing partisan divides have appropriated 
from them.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Today’s political landscape has created numerous obstacles for 
voters to freely choose their elected officials.  Legislative alteration or 
nullification of voter-approved initiatives that change how legislators 
are elected only serves to further erode the power of a person’s vote.  
When legislators can further entrench themselves in power by 
undermining the intent of the electorate, faith in our representative 
democracy erodes.  While empowering initiatives poses new and 
daunting challenges, this moment in history necessitates structural 
changes that offer a powerful check on political elites.  When voters 
decide to expand the franchise, politicians should not be able to have the 
final say.  When voters impose term limits, legislators should not merely 
be able to set them aside and remain in their jobs indefinitely.  This 
Comment has proposed one remedy for this dilemma that, particularly 
in states with initiated constitutional amendments, requires only the 
will of the electorate to implement.  States that allow the electorate to 
enact voting and electoral reforms through ballot initiatives to expand 
access to the franchise, strengthen ethics and campaign finance rules, 
and limit their legislators in other ways should protect those reforms by 
enacting procedural and substantive constraints on their legislature 
that prevent representatives from nullifying the express will of their 
constituents.  Such structural reforms have the potential, even when 
posed as mere threats, to change legislative behavior to better 
accommodate the desires of the electorate.  If only for that purpose, the 
proposal made here provides voters with a powerful tool in the toolbox 
to assert themselves in the face of legislative efforts to limit the 
franchise, lower the ethical bar, or otherwise misbehave. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 - Electoral and Voting Reform Initiatives, 2000-2019215 
Arizona 
    2000 Establish appointed Redistricting Commission to redraw boundaries for legislative 
districts 
    2004 STATUTE: Prop 200: Would require proof of U.S. citizenship in order to vote 
California 
    2000 Prop 39: Authorizes local school bond issues for certain uses if approved by 55% 
    2008 STATUTE: Prop 11: Independent commission to draw legislative district boundaries 
    2012 Prop 28: Limit of 8 years (senate)/6 years (assembly) replaced with 12-year limit 
on combined service 
    2016 STATUTE Prop 73: Limits on Campaign donations 
Prop 54: Conditions under which legislative bills can be passed 
Colorado 
    2004 Initiative 27: Reduces contribution amount to candidates and various political 
organizations 
    2006 Initiative 41: Prohibits elected officials or their immediate family members from 
accepting gifts 
    2008 Initiative 54: Closes a remaining loophole in CO election law by banning the practice 
of “Pay to Play” 
    2016 STATUTE: Prop 107: Open presidential primary elections  
STATUTE: Prop 108: Unaffiliated electors voting in primaries 
Amendment 71: Distribution and supermajority requirements for initiatives 
Florida 
    2010 Amendment 5: Amends current practice of drawing legislative district boundaries 
Amendment 6: Amends current practice of drawing congressional  
district boundaries 
    2018 Amendment 4: Restores right to vote for most people with prior felony convictions 
upon completion of their sentences 
Michigan 
    2018 Proposal 2: Creates independent citizens redistricting commission 
Proposal 3: Voting Policies in State Constitution Initiative (Straight-ticket voting; 
automatic voter registration; same-day registration) 
Missouri 
    2016 Amendment 2: Regulations on campaign contributions 
    2018 Amendment 1: Addresses lobbying, campaign finance, and redistricting procedures 
 
 
 215 The table below includes any initiatives enacted between 2000 and 2019 that 
addressed voting and electoral reform.  I included in this definition any initiatives 
involving campaign finance, election procedures, expansion or contraction of the 
franchise, redistricting, term limits, and restrictions on legislators’ conduct.  These 
initiatives were compiled from Ballotpedia’s database of state ballot initiatives, which 
are catalogued by state and then by year.  This chart does not include all states that allow 
initiatives in some form, but merely the states that enacted initiatives that fit these 
categories.  See List of Ballot Measures by State, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
List_of_ballot_measures_by_state. 
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Montana 
    2006 STATUTE: I-153: Prevents state officials and their staff from becoming  
licensed lobbyists 
    2012 STATUTE: I-166: Set policy on prohibiting corporate contributions  
and expenditures in Montana elections 
Nebraska 
    2004 Measure 415: Limits legislators to no more than two consecutive terms 
Measure 418: Requires 2/3 majority of state legislature to modify  
initiatives approved by voters  
North Dakota 
    2018 Measure 1: Establishes an ethics commission, bans foreign political  
contributions, and enacts provisions related to lobbying and conflicts of interest 
Measure 2: Citizen Requirement for Voting Amendment Initiative 
Oregon 
    2006 STATUTE: Measure 47: Puts restrictions on campaign contributions 
South Dakota 
    2016 STATUTE: Measure 22: Revise campaign finance and lobbying laws 
Washington 
    2004 STATUTE Initiative 872: Establishes top-two primary for state elections 
 
